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Abstract—Technology roadmapping provides a tool for 
technology planning and selecting what to pursue in what 
timeframes. In this paper, a game-theoretic framework for 
technology roadmap planning is proposed to address the 
enumeration, selection and evaluation of possible evolution paths 
for technology roadmapping characterized by an iterative and 
competitive technology development process between companies 
within one tradespace. More specifically, the framework 
including companies as game players demonstrates the most 
favorable reactions to each other's technology development by 
approximated best response functions. Next, the selection process 
of optimal development paths is carried out to evaluate the 
possible payoffs using backward induction. Finally, a case is 
studied to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach. 
Keywords—technology roadmapping, technology planning, 
game theory, best response. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, companies are confronting an increasing 
competition challenge [1]. Technology roadmapping is used to 
provide guidance to organizations in coping with growing 
competitive environments - it identifies company’s critical 
needs, and helps to select the appropriate technology 
alternatives. Technology planning is a critical activity in 
industries with rapid technology evolution such as information 
and telecommunication technologies, as well as 
manufacturing, aerospace, and transportation, among others. 
In this paper, we are proposing a novel game-theoretic 
framework for technology planning and roadmapping. We 
consider a group of competitors as a group of players where 
each player has a set of evolution strategies with several 
technology alternatives. Both players are considered to be 
rational and willing to embrace the strategy that maximizes its 
payoffs. The following framework makes the process of 
technology planning more strategically oriented in the terms 
of competing environment by taking into consideration the 
development of the other player. 
Both players are willing to know the future possible design 
strategies at the tradespace, which are allocated in their 
preferable direction of developing the characteristics. The 
players evaluate the design strategies suggested by the 
framework and choose the most promising and realistic as a 
field for the company’s Research & Development (R&D). 
Various quantitative methods on technology planning and 
roadmapping were summarized by Heidenberger and Stummer 
[2]. They classified methods in several categories: benefit 
measurement methods; mathematical programming; decision 
and game theory approaches; simulation models, heuristic 
methods; cognitive emulation approaches. In the terms of 
increasing competitive environment game theory approach 
comes to the central stage.  
Game theory is the study of rational decision-making and 
helps to understand how strategic interactions affect rational 
decisions of individual players or companies in a competitive 
and uncertain environment if each player aims to get the best 
payoff [3]. The game-theoretic approach takes into 
consideration company’s competitive environment that might 
be uncertain. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section introduces key concepts of game theory, 
game-theoretic approaches and its application in the design of 
complex engineering systems.  
A. Game theory and Nash equilibrium
A formal model in game theory consists of players, a set of
their strategies and payoffs from each strategy combination. 
One of the main concepts is a nash equilibrium (NE) which 
represents a combination of decisions where no player has an 
incentive to deviate from his decision [4].  
A strategy x* is NE from the set of strategies Si for player i 
with payoff function u(x) if: 
Si: ui (xi*, x-i*) ui (xi, x-i*)                       (1)     
The condition (1) means that each player i, in playing a 
strategy xi*, is playing the best response to the other’s strategy 
choice.  
B. Best-response dynamics 
In best-response (BR) dynamics, each player chooses his 
best response to the current actions of the other player.  
The best response (BR) of player i, Bi (x-i ), is: 
Bi (x-i) ׫ arg max ui (xi, x-i*)                       (2)     
Then the equivalent characterization from the condition 
(2): a strategy xi* is a NE iff 
xi* ׫ Bi (x-i) for all i                               (3)     
A necessary condition for BR dynamics is convergence to 
NE from an initial strategy profile. It means the existence of a 
path induced by best-response reaction sets that connects the 
initial start strategy to NE [4]. Players can construct their path 
by building BR functions using their opponents’ strategies 
estimation from the past games [5]. BR functions can be 
represented as linear or non-linear functions with one or more 
NE with axis of the variables [6].  
C. Backward induction 
Backward induction (BI) is a general concept for 
sequential games of perfect information. The method starts 
from the analysis of the latest strategies of the first player and 
proceeds to the search of a subgame perfect nash equilibrium 
(SPE). Using this information the second player can determine 
which strategy to choose at the second to last stage. The 
process continues backward until reaching the first stage of the 
game. The set of SPE of all game stages is a subset of NE for 
the whole game.  
D. Game-theoretic approaches 
Game-theoretic approaches are used in engineering 
systems design for multi-objective design and multi-agent 
planning problems. The theoretical and mathematical basis of 
games is used to abstract the processes required to design a 
complex system.  
The model of multiobjective design has been used to 
analyze the convergence characteristics of the design process, 
and the quality of equilibrium solutions in the situation of 
decentralized designers [7]. Chanron and Lewis [8] assumed 
that decision makers follow an iterative process of 
communication and developed the vector, scalarization, and 
trade-off-curve methods to achieve multiobjective solutions.  
In [9] a Coalition-Planning game formulation has been 
developed for self-interested players with personal goals who 
find beneficial the cooperation with each other to increase 
their personal net benefit. The research focused on cooperative 
self-interested agents in groups [10] and game scenarios in 
resource coalition [11].  
Furthermore, a pure game-theoretic approach has been 
proposed to perform a strategic analysis of all possible player 
strategies and define equilibria based on the relationships 
between different solutions in game-theoretic terms [12]. 
Jordan and Onaindia [13] used game-theoretic approach for 
non-cooperative planning to predict the plan schedules which 
player will adopt so that the set of strategies of all players 
constitute NE.  
In [14-15] product portfolio planning is considered as a 
combinatorial optimization problem for a competitive 
duopolistic market. The game-theoretic frameworks were 
proposed to derive NE for optimal product configuration for 
both manufacturers. A development planning approach using 
game theory and network model was suggested in [16] to 
address the strategy selection and evolution of weapons 
systems-of-systems characterized by a competition between 
countries. 
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The novelty of this paper is the proposal of a game theory-
based technology planning framework which aims at 
enumerating and evaluating efficient technology evolution 
paths taking into consideration the actions of others players as 
illustrated in the tradespace. The evolution paths are following 
the preferable directions at the tradespace of chosen FOMs 
and contains the future possible design strategies suggested by 
the framework. 
A. Game model 
The game model considered in this research is a sequential 
game with two players who possess perfect information about 
the past games and about each other. We use the assumption 
for building the first-run framework to get the results and 
evaluate them in these conditions. The conditions of perfect 
information are rarely met in the real economic environment 
and for that reason; the next game model will be based on the 
imperfect information.   
These players are two competing companies that practice 
technology roadmapping and plan their research investments 
to put into a new project considering the competitor’s potential 
moves at the technology tradespace. The players are assumed 
to be rational and their goal is to plan their technology 
development with possible design strategies in the way to 
maximize the possible payoffs of the strategies. The perfect 
knowledge assumption is the first step in the analysis; the 
extension of this framework to partial knowledge will be 
subject of future work.  
The model assumes a tradespace of viable technology 
investment options mapped using two figures of merit 
(FOMs), FOM1 and FOM2, characterizing the selected 
technology. Future work will address the case of tradespaces 
mapped using multiple FOMs. The two FOMs herein are 
considered pertain to both players and map the players’ 
development stage of their technology within the tradespace. 
Another input needed for the framework concerns Pareto 
frontiers projected into the future, which show all possible 
non-dominated technology design points at the tradespace. 
The current technology levels of players are supposed to be 
defined by the models lately put on the market. The previous 
development process is set as known, as it is needed for 
further analysis. Consequently, the historical data of the 
released models are the main input used for identifying the 
trends of company’s technology development, which can be 
built into the future.  
In real competitive markets, two competing technology 
companies rarely release their products at the exact same time. 
Before the new product is produced, the company announces 
their willingness to release it to the market and the 
approximate time. The competitors can consider this 
information. Using announced information about future 
releases and the date of the last release, the next company can 
determine the new product for the market. 
Therefore, the whole development process of moving from 
one Pareto frontier to another is analyzed as a sequential game 
where both players move one after another at the tradespace. It 
is assumed the first player has a first-mover advantage that 
means he will choose first the best-response reaction to the 
current position of the second player. It is reasoned by the fact 
that for the current moment one of the players has released a 
new product and the second one is getting ready to introduce 
its new model. The scenario here considered is illustrated in 
Fig.1. 
Fig. 1. Example of 2-players tradespace with predicted Pareto frontier and 
 BR reaction set 
B. Framework 
The proposed framework consists of several steps of 
analyzing historical data of technology evolution and 
forecasting the possible development process and the possible 
design points into the future based on Pareto frontiers 
The framework follows the next steps: 
1) Step 1: Analyze historical data of player’s technology 
development and building BR functions for both selected 
FOMs: the historical data from the past games, which are 
considered to be the previous technology development by the 
players (e.g. companies), is used for approximating the BR 
functions. The intersection of those BR functions gives the NE 
which both players are trying to reach in ideal conditions. The 
current players’ positions are marked on the BR functions and 
the BR reactions sets are estimated by projecting on each 
others BR function until the NE is reached. 
2) Step 2: Select the design points on the predicted Pareto 
frontiers at the tradespace: following their estimation, the BR 
reaction sets are projected on the technology tradespace. The 
alternative design points are determined as the intersections of 
the predicted Pareto frontiers and the players’ BR reaction 
sets. Fig. 1 shows graphically the process of determining the 
possible evolution design points. 
3) Step 3: Enumerate all possible technology evolution 
paths: based on the enumerated design points, Nash equilibria 
are mapped on the trade space. The sequential game tree is 
built from the defined designs starting from the 1st player's 
strategy set. 
4) Step 4: Evaluate the evolution paths and the design 
points by backward induction: in this step, the comparison of 
alternative evolution paths is performed following the 
estimation of potential design points along the game tree.  
5) Step 5: Identify the NE evolution technology path: the 
optimal evolution path is defined by backward induction on 
the game tree. 
The result of the analysis is a set of optimal alternative 
design points on the Pareto frontiers for Player 1. The set can 
be used as a family of potential strategies for the roadmapping 
process. It helps to determine one of the possible ways of 
technology evolution. It shows how the concerned company 
can react in the best way to the other company’s technology 
development. 
IV. RESULTS AND VALIDATION 
A first implementation of the framework was made. The 
following section explains the case study used for assessing 
the performance and validation of the framework.  
A. Case study  
The market of Graphic Processing Units (GPU) is used as 
a case study topic; AMD and NVIDIA are the key players in 
the retail market of GPUs. The dataset was taken from the 
open source GPU database [17], which contains a reference 
list of most graphics cards released in recent years and the 
models reviews. 
The development of AMD’s and NVIDIA’s GPU models 
since 2010 is shown in Fig. 2. The technology tradespace is 
formed for two FOMs: theoretical GPU Performance in 
GFLOPS and Cost in USD. 
 
Fig. 2. AMD and NVIDIA models according to the release date.  
The dataset of GPU models contains information about the 
main technical characteristics: bandwidth in GB/s; memory 
size in MB; floating-point performance in GFLOPS; the 
release date in the decimal year, and the released price with 
and without inflation in USD. Fig. 3 illustrates the example of 
the used dataset. 
 
Fig. 3. Example of the sample of GPU dataset used for the framework. 
The first approach to analyze data is to classify all models 
according to the technical characteristics and use the 
framework inside each category. As a result, the whole GPU 
market can be divided into 4 segments according to 
bandwidth, memory bus and price: High End GPU; 
Performance GPU; Middle End GPU; and Low End GPU. 
Another approach is to look and analyze the development of 
flagships of both companies which present the new technology 
or technology development of the new GPU generation or 
family. It is important to use the correct approach to define the 
sample of data which will contain the trend of BR functions. 
B. Results   
In this section, an illustrative example is presented. It 
demonstrates the analysis of competition in the development 
process of GPU flagship products, that is, High End GPUs for 
each given year.  
Fig. 4 illustrates the Step 1, analyzing the historical data of 
the player’s technology development and building the BR 
functions for both selected FOM of the proposed framework. 
 
Fig. 4. BR functions of the FOM, Performance.  
The BR functions for the floating-point performance are 
built for AMD and NVIDIA based on the chosen sample of 
released models which are considering as historical BR 
reaction sets. Fig. 5 shows the NE point for the floating-point 
performance as the intersection of two linear BR functions. 
 
Fig. 5. Determination of NE for the chosen FOM based on BR functions   
The step of estimation of BR reaction sets can be  
computationally consuming, depending on how far from the 
NE point, the players have their current technology position at 
the tradespace. The closer the players are coming to NE, the 
smaller the steps are, the more time is needed (Fig. 6). 
 Fig. 6. BR reactions set of both players converging to the NE.   
As the Pareto frontiers are needed in Step 2, selecting the 
design points on the predicted Pareto frontiers at the 
tradespace, the accuracy of the prediction influence on the 
alternative design points which will be evaluated later by the 
method. The results of the application of the proposed 
framework show the importance of accuracy of forecasting the 
evolution of Pareto frontiers over time. Pareto frontiers and 
BR reaction sets derive the strategy design points. The actual 
prediction of Pareto frontiers is not the part of this research, 
that is why only the part of data can be used for analysis and 
technology planning. 
In the example of GPU development, the competition 
between the players is noticeable in the releases of flagships. 
The flagship models of each GPU generation are the core 
products that demonstrate the best technical characteristics of 
the new generation. 
 
Fig. 7. GPU Tradespace with possible design strategies for NVIDIA 
Fig. 7 shows the example of two not-smoothed Pareto 
frontiers in two subsequent years 2010 and 2011. In this case, 
NVIDIA and AMD are playing a sequential game of moving 
from Pareto frontier 2010 to Pareto frontier 2011. It is 
assumed NVIDIA has the first-mover advantage and reacts to 
the AMD position, which is taken as given. AMD’s start 
position is the design point with performance 520 GFLOPS 
and cost 89,28 USD. The NVIDIA’s start position is the 
design point with performance 600 GFLOPS and cost 144.66 
USD. The estimated NVIDIA’s BR price and performance 
results in possible evolution technology points. They are the 
design points with performance 698.4 GFLOPS and price 97.3 
USD, 601.3 GFLOPS and 84.98 USD, 601.3 GFLOPS and 
97.3 USD where NVIDIA can move from its start position. 
The game tree is formed out of the technology points. It shows 
all possible payoffs for the certain stage of one of the players. 
The following game tree can be built for one or both FOMs 
depending on whether one or two FOMs are considered during 
BI. From the results, it can be seen that the player can at most 
converge to the future Pareto frontier with the jump in one of 
the considering FOMs or move to the visible part under Pareto 
frontier by trying to improve both FOMs. Fig. 8 shows the 
game tree built for possible performance reaction sets of both 
companies where the top of the tree is NVIDIA’s start 
performance. 
 
Fig. 8. Game tree for GPU performance.  
One of the essential steps in the framework is the 
approximation of BR functions. The reliability of BR functions 
depends on the number of data points used for its estimation 
and how easy the trend of the functions can be defined. During 
the timeframe from 2010 until 2017 only around 200 of 
different GPU models were released and only around 10% can 
be studied as flagships of GPU generations. This sample size 
(~20 data points) is not enough for highly reliable BR 
functions. Therefore, the present GPU case study suggests that 
the proposed framework requires large datasets to be validated, 
but it will require another approach for taking a sample from 
the initial dataset. 
C. Validation   
The purpose of validation analysis is to ensure that the 
proposed framework suggests sufficient evolution technology 
paths. 
If historical data exist (in our case), part of the data is used 
to build the model and the remaining data are used to 
determine and test whether the model behaves as the system 
does [18]. Hence, the main approach of validation analysis is 
backward testing on the historical data. The initial dataset is cut 
by the certain year and the models released before the cut year 
are used to predict future player’s moves at the tradespace and 
afterward compare the result design points to the known 
historical models. 
Fig. 11. Comparison of GPU models predicted and released by NVIDIA.  
The NVIDIA predicted design points are models with 
performance 698.4 GFLOPS and 601.3 GFLOPS, and price 
97.3 USD and 84.9 USD respectively. The NVIDIA released 
models in 2011 are models with performance 311 GFLOPS 
and 155.5 GFLOPS, and price 87.44 USD and 64.26 USD 
respectively. If assume the first predicted model corresponds 
with the first released model (Fig. 11), then the biggest 
difference in performance is 445,8 GFLOPS what goes to 
most nearly 3 times difference; the smallest difference is by 
the factor of 2. In that order the biggest price difference is 20.7 
USD, meanwhile, the smallest is 9.8 USD what is 11% of the 
difference. The framework shows better results for the FOM 
price. The difference might be the result of the listed external 
factors, which were not taken into consideration in the 
framework. Taking the sample from the initial dataset can be 
considered for the technical characteristics like the floating-
point performance, and the framework should be tested on 
bigger datasets of different technologies and for various 
technical characteristics. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This research proposes a novel game-theoretic approach for 
competitive technology planning in the terms of technology 
roadmapping. A competitive planning framework informing 
technology roadmapping has been developed, assuming a 
competitive environment modeled as a sequential game 
between two players with perfect knowledge. The proposed 
framework supports decision-makers in strategically account 
for potential competition moves in their technology 
roadmapping process. A case study is presented based on a 
publicly available dataset of GPUs, focusing on flagship GPU 
products. The results of the application of the proposed 
framework show the importance of correct samples for 
building BR functions and the importance of the accurate 
construction of them. 
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with the first released model (Fig. 11), then the biggest 
difference in performance is 445,8 GFLOPS what goes to 
most nearly 3 times difference; the smallest difference is by 
the factor of 2. In that order the biggest price difference is 20.7 
USD, meanwhile, the smallest is 9.8 USD what is 11% of the 
difference. The framework shows better results for the FOM 
price. The difference might be the result of the listed external 
factors, which were not taken into consideration in the 
framework. Taking the sample from the initial dataset can be 
considered for the technical characteristics like the floating-
point performance, and the framework should be tested on 
bigger datasets of different technologies and for various 
technical characteristics. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This research proposes a novel game-theoretic approach for 
competitive technology planning in the terms of technology 
roadmapping. A competitive planning framework informing 
technology roadmapping has been developed, assuming a 
competitive environment modeled as a sequential game 
between two players with perfect knowledge. The proposed 
framework supports decision-makers in strategically account 
for potential competition moves in their technology 
roadmapping process. A case study is presented based on a 
publicly available dataset of GPUs, focusing on flagship GPU 
products. The results of the application of the proposed 
framework show the importance of correct samples for 
building BR functions and the importance of the accurate 
construction of them. 
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